Managing water pollution to revitalise the shrimp supply chain in Tam Giang Cau Hai Lagoon, Vietnam by Truong, H. et al.
 UMK Procedia  1 ( 2014 )  50 – 56 
2214-0115 © 2014 Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Universiti Malaysia Kelantan. 
doi: 10.1016/j.umkpro.2014.07.007 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
International Agribusiness Marketing Conference 2013, IAMC 2013, 22-23 October 2013, Kuala 
Lumpur, Selangor, Malaysia 
Managing water pollution to revitalise the shrimp supply chain 
in Tam Giang Cau Hai Lagoon, Vietnam 
 
Hieu Truonga, Michael Lyneb,* and Keith Woodfordc 
 
aHue University, Quangtri Province Branch, Vietnam 
bLincoln University, New Zealand and University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa 
cLincoln University, New Zealand 
 
Abstract 
The area of shrimps farmed in the Tam Giang Cau Hai Lagoon expanded dramatically from 1995 to 2004, but then declined 
steadily. An exploratory investigation of the shrimp supply chain conducted in 2009 revealed that well- established  relational  
contracts between  shrimp  farmers  and  wholesalers  had  succumbed  to  environmental  risk following persistent and 
widespread outbreaks of disease in the Lagoon. These outbreaks have been attributed to water pollution, which - in turn - 
has been linked to the rapid expansion and intensification of shrimp production. While privatisation of the lagoon bed 
encouraged farmers to adopt more intensive production methods, over- intensification can be attributed to the open access 
nature of lagoon water, which allows farmers to externalise the cost of their water pollution. This study evaluates a range of 
pollution abatement instruments against well-known criteria and concludes that transferable quotas for shrimp seed would be 
the most effective policy instrument given prevailing social, institutional, organisational and political conditions. Even so, the 
introduction and administration of seed quotas pose major challenges that would require co-management with local user 
groups. 
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1. Introduction 
Supply  chain  management  is  a  topic  that  has  attracted  the  interest  of  many  researchers  and 
practitioners because market competition is no longer between individual firms but between supply chains (Trkman 
et al., 2007; Li et al., 2005). Food supply chains differ from those in other sectors owing to the perishable nature of 
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products and production that is characterised by dependence on natural conditions, seasonality and a lag between 
production and harvest, all of which make output unpredictable. A food chain evolves within particular social, 
institutional and natural settings, and individual firms within the chain are exposed to risks facing other firms 
(Hallikas et al., 2004). These risks may be behavioural (e.g. opportunism) or environmental (e.g. disease, natural 
disasters, economic shocks and changes in policy or technology) (Trkman & McCormack, 2009). According to 
Williamson (1996), higher levels of chain coordination help to manage behavioural risk, but coordination becomes 
more difficult as the level of environmental risk increases. 
 
The area of shrimps farmed in Tam Giang Lagoon expanded at an average rate of 400% each year from 1995 to 
2004 (Truong, 2012 p. 53). After peaking at 4,000ha in 2004, the area fell steadily to 2,700ha in 2008 
following persistent and widespread outbreaks of disease in the Lagoon. Hop et al. (2005) and Thung (2007) 
conducted experiments that showed some alarming indicators of deteriorating water quality in the Lagoon between 
1998 and 2004. These indicators included diminishing levels of diffused oxygen (i.e. an increase of organic 
pollution) - especially in places close to crowded shrimp farming areas, greater nutrient loads entering the lagoon 
and less absorptive capacity of the natural environment - conditions conducive to eutrophication, higher levels of 
total coliform density, and higher levels of organochlorine pesticides in the sediment. Water pollution poses a 
serious threat to all farmers who  raise shrimps in  the  Lagoon and  the  resultant yield risk is  not  only co -
variant (i.e. risk that simultaneously affects the vast majority of producers) but also systemic (i.e. it creates 
risk for other agents in the chain). It is estimated that some 100,000 poor people rely directly on aquaculture 
and capture fisheries in TGCG Lagoon as their main livelihood activity (Tuyen et al., 2010). 
 
This research addresses three related questions: Why has the quality of TGCH Lagoon water deteriorated so 
rapidly? How has water pollution impacted on the Lagoon’s shrimp supply chain? How can the water pollution 
problem best be managed? To answer these questions, the authors drew on relevant literature in the fields of 
institutional economics, supply chain management and environmental economics, conducted an exploratory case 
study of the TGCH shrimp supply chain, and consulted key informants in local and provincial government 
authorities to help assess policy options. The paper identifies a set of pollution abatement instruments that could be 
applied to aquaculture in TGCH Lagoon, and tests them against normative criteria in order to recommend an 
appropriate policy. 
 
2. Why has the Lagoon’s water quality deteriorated so rapidly? 
 
There are several sources of water pollution in the Lagoon including; (i) aquaculture production and other 
livelihood activities in the lagoon, (ii) agricultural production activities in upstream areas, and (iii) industrial 
production and urban dwellers in the lagoon catchment. There is no study to date quantifying the respective 
contribution of each of these sources of pollution. However, aquaculture - and shrimp culture in particular - has been 
clearly linked to the Lagoon’s environmental deterioration (Tuyen, 2002; Huong & Berkes, 2011). Moreover, 
pollution levels closely tracked the growth of aquaculture. This study focuses only on pollution caused by 
aquaculture. 
 
In 1993, the Vietnamese government issued Decree 64/CP which allowed households to exercise exclusive rights 
to certain parts of the lagoon bed in order to practice aquaculture. Demand for secure property rights was strong 
because export prices for giant tiger shrimps was increasing (FAO, undated)  and farmers wanted to protect their 
investment in shrimp enclosures (Phap  et al., 2002 p.30). The Provincial People’s Committee responded by issuing 
Red Book property rights to fixed-gear fishers located near the shoreline who converted their net and fence 
enclosures into earthen-walled ponds for shrimp production (Huong & Berkes, 2011). Shrimp farmers operating in 
deeper water further from the shore privatised the lagoon bed by erecting fine-mesh nets. Many of these farmers 
were allowed to formalise their de facto exclusive rights to the lagoon bed by taking up five-year and one-year 
permits issued by district and commune authorities respectively (Huong & Berkes, 2011). 
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However, privatisation related only to the lagoon bed and not to the lagoon water. To emphasise this point, it is 
useful to distinguish between shrimp farmers who constructed earthen-walled ponds in the shallows of the Lagoon 
and those operating in deeper water who erected net enclosures to contain their shrimps. When considering net 
enclosures, it is clear that the water passing through the nets is not a private resource (characterised by exclusive 
property rights) but rather a common pool resource (characterised by inclusive  property rights).  Moreover, the use  
of  water  to  grow shrimps  was  not governed by the common property rules that regulated the extraction of fish. 
Like the air above a factory, the lagoon water became an open access resource to farmers producing shrimps in net 
enclosures. The same argument can be applied to pond farmers if they are able to discharge polluted water into the 
lagoon. In theory, regulations preventing the discharge of polluted water from shrimp ponds would internalise the 
cost of pollution to these farmers, encouraging them to adopt cleaner production methods. In practice, it is not cost-
effective to police such regulations given the existence of thousands of small and inaccessible ponds. 
 
Unfortunately, the privatisation of Tam Giang Lagoon for shrimp production was not well regulated. Zoning was 
not implemented and natural waterways were blocked by earthen walls and fine-mesh nets (Tuyen et al., 2010). 
Pond farmers were not required to construct treatment ponds where polluted water could be cleaned before it was 
released into the lagoon. Not only did the area used to produce shrimps increase rapidly but farmers also adopted 
intensive production methods (Huong & Berkes, 2011). The evolving mix of private and open access property rights 
encouraged shrimp farmers to intensify their production methods as they were able to internalise the benefits of their 
investment while externalising the cost of their water pollution. In addition, the ‘Red Books’ issued to many owners 
improved their ability to finance investments in shrimp farming because formal lenders accepted these certificates as 
collateral for loans (Xuan & Hoa, 2005; Tinh, 2005). Together, the expansion and intensification of shrimp 
production elevated the concentration of contaminants (excess feed, shrimp waste and chemicals) over a larger part 
of the lagoon. In the absence of zoning to keep natural waterways open, it was inevitable that water quality would 
deteriorate. 
 
3. How has water pollution impacted on the Lagoon’s shrimp supply chain? 
 
To answer this question, an exploratory case study was made of the TGCH shrimp supply chain in 2009 focusing 
on dyadic relationships between agents in the chain. In-depth interviews were conducted with ten shrimp farmers, 
nine wholesalers - ranging from very small to large in size - three local retailers and the only shrimp processing-
exporting company located in Thua Thien Hue Province. The respondents were purposively selected at each stage of 
the supply chain to ensure variation in the size of transactors and  markets  served.  Themes  common  to  all  of  the  
interviews  included  the  development  of  the respondent’s business, its role in the chain, current performance, 
access to inputs, relationships with input providers, access to customers, and relationships with buyers. 
 
Most farmers purchase shrimp seed on credit from a wholesaler and verbally agree to supply the wholesaler  with  
mature  shrimps.  These  interlinked  contracts  resulted  in  fairly  strong  relationships between  farmers  and  
wholesalers  while  the  shrimp  industry  was  growing.  While some  farmers complained of a hold-up problem 
created by wholesalers intent on lowering the price once the shrimps had been harvested, and some wholesalers 
complained that farmers engaged in side-selling to avoid repaying their loans, most of the respondents perceived 
satisfactory levels of trust in their relational contracts. Farmers did admit to loan defaults but made it clear that they 
had been unable to repay their loans owing to substantial yield losses following outbreaks of disease. Wholesalers 
readily acknowledged the problem and stated that yields had become so volatile that they could no longer offer 
farmers contracts for a specific quantity and quality of shrimp. The supply chain problem was not one of behavioural 
risk but rather one of environmental risk. Small wholesalers dependent on the local shrimp supplies were forced to 
reduce the scale of their shrimp business and some quit the industry altogether. Downstream dyads also collapsed 
with a wholesaler in Thuan An township lamenting that “some processor-exporters who bought shrimps produced in 
Tam Giang Cau Hai Lagoon now source their shrimps in Quang Tri and Quang Binh Provinces”. 
 
The exploratory case study revealed that the  TGCH shrimp supply chain was in  decline. Both wholesaler and 
farmer respondents attributed the breakdown of chain relationships to the spread of diseases that caused widespread 
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losses in production after 2004. Covariant yield risk made it impossible to fulfil supply contracts all along the 
shrimp supply chain. In short, relationships built on trust and incentive compliant contracts were overwhelmed by 
heightened environmental risk that was, in part, a consequence of pollution created by over-exploitation of open 
access lagoon water. 
 
4. How can the Lagoon’s water pollution problem best be managed? 
 
4.1. Policy options to manage pollution caused by aquaculture 
 
Water pollution would be less of a problem at TGCH Lagoon had the lagoon been zoned and its privatisation 
regulated to keep natural waterways open. Retrospective zoning will require expropriation of shrimp farms or parts 
of shrimp farms blocking these waterways. Market related compensation would no doubt help to expedite this 
process, and so improve the water quality as less waste would accumulate near the shrimp farms and overload the 
absorptive capacity of the local ecosystem. However, this would not eliminate the pollution and disease problems as 
farmers will continue to over-utilise the lagoon water while it remains an open access resource. 
 
In theory, pollution could be addressed by imposing physical restrictions on stocking rates, by introducing 
market-based pollution abatement instruments, or by altering property rights to the lagoon water. Physical 
restrictions include limits on production (output quotas), on inputs used (input quotas) or on the amount of pollution 
discharged (pollution permits). Market-based measures refer to instruments like input taxes, output taxes, pollution 
taxes, tradable output or input quotas, and tradable pollution permits. The environmental outcomes of non-tradable 
and tradable quotas are the same as they both dictate limits on production. They also entail similar challenges in 
monitoring and enforcing. However, transferable quotas are expected to result in better allocative efficiency over 
time as they impose an opportunity cost on less effective farmers who stand to earn more by selling or leasing their 
quotas to more effective farmers. To better realise these allocative efficiency advantages, input and output quotas 
should be detached from farmers’ rights to the lagoon water and lagoon bed. In the sections that follow, all 
references to quotas imply tradable quotas.  
 
Changing the property rights regime refers to either privatisation or ‘unitisation’† *of an open access common 
pool resource. Privatising the lagoon water (as opposed to the lagoon bed) is not feasible owing to natural movement 
of water through the Lagoon. In addition, privatising the lagoon water to individual shrimp farmers will not 
eliminate its over-exploitation if farmers are still able to externalise the cost of pollution by discharging 
contaminated water into public waterways. Unitisation is discussed in Section 4.4 as a complementary setting for 
market-based instruments. 
 
4.2. Normative assessment criteria 
 
Criteria used to make normative assessments of environmental policy instruments typically include their 
environmental effectiveness, static efficiency, cost-efficiency, flexibility, and political and administrative feasibility 
(Majone, 1976; Bohm & Russell, 1985, U.S. Department of Energy, 1989, U.S. Congress, 1995; Hole, 1996; Revesz 
& Stavins, 2007). The relative importance of these criteria depends on prevailing  circumstances and  priorities.  
Given  the  Lagoon’s critical  livelihoods role,  first-order priority was assigned to environmental effectiveness and 
administrative feasibility. Environmental effectiveness refers to the level of ‘action forcing’ that an instrument 
imposes on polluters. Administrative feasibility refers to  the  amount of  money and  information required  to  
implement and  manage the instrument. Second-order priority was given to static efficiency, cost-efficiency, 
flexibility and political feasibility. Static efficiency refers to the optimal production level of polluters. Cost-
efficiency refers to the extent to which the instrument achieves the intended environmental goal at least cost. 
 
* Unitisation implies a shift from open access to common property where rates of exploitation are governed by rules established and enforced by, 
or with, user groups 
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Assessment criteria 
Output 
quotas 
Seed 
quotas 
Pollution 
quotas 
Output 
taxes 
Seed 
taxes 
Pollution 
taxes 
Environmental effectiveness high high very high high high very high 
Administrative feasibility: low high very low low low very low 
- Information cost high low very high high high very high 
- Governance cost high high very high high high very high 
Cost efficiency moderate moderate  high high  
Static efficiency low low  low low  
Flexibility: 
- Ability of farmers to respond to the 
very high 
high 
high 
high 
 low 
low 
low 
low 
 
- Ability of farmers to respond to the high low  high low  
- Adaptability of the instrument high high  low low  
Political acceptability: 
- Political risk 
High 
low 
high 
low 
 low 
high 
low 
high 
 
Flexibility refers to the ability of farmers to respond to the policy instrument and to changes in the business 
environment, and the ability of administrators to adapt the instrument to changes in ecological and socioeconomic 
environments. Political acceptability should be considered from both government and community perspectives. 
 
4.3. Assessment of policy options 
 
The analysis summarised in Table 1 assumes that the property rights regime is unchanged and that the policy 
instruments are imposed by regulators on farmers who have private access to the lagoon bed and open access to 
lagoon water. The rankings assigned to instruments on each of the assessment criteria are subjective, reflecting the 
perceptions of key informants in local and provincial government authorities, and insights  drawn  from  the  
literature.  Pollution quotas  and  taxes  were  ranked  above  the  other instruments in terms of environmental 
effectiveness, but were viewed as too costly to administer owing largely to measurement problems. Quota 
restrictions on shrimp outputs and seed inputs were ranked above output and input taxes owing to their superior cost 
efficiency, political acceptability and flexibility. Output quotas, unlike input quotas, allow farmers to respond freely 
to relative changes in input prices. However, seed quotas were considered superior on the first-order administrative 
criterion because shrimp seed is supplied by a small number of hatcheries. Individually transferable quotas (ITQs) 
for shrimp seed were therefore selected as the preferred instrument. 
 
Despite   their   administrative   advantage,   seed   ITQs   still   pose   considerable   challenges   to 
implementation. First, the Lagoon would have to be partitioned into zones within which quotas would be 
transferable. Each zone should be relatively homogeneous with respect to ecology, farmers and their farming 
practices. Second, technical assessments would be required to determine the aggregate quota for † Unitisation 
implies a shift from open access to common property where rates of exploitation are governed by rules established 
and enforced by, or with, user groups.  each zone. If substitution between species is to be permitted, then appropriate 
quota substitution ratios must also be determined. Third, decisions must be taken on the initial allocation of quotas. 
If quotas are to be grandfathered in proportion to existing levels of production, then recent production information 
must be gathered for each farmer. Fourth, administrative structures and processes are required to support well- 
functioning markets for quotas and to prevent farmers from purchasing seed in excess of their quotas. 
 
Table 1. Synthesis of Policy Instrument Assessments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4. Co-management as a complementary policy option 
 
Fishery  Associations  (FAs)  currently  operating  at  the  village  or  sub-village  level  could  be instrumental in 
reducing the costs of administering seed ITQs. FA’s are user groups whose members share similar resource 
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exploitation practices in a well-defined area of the Lagoon (Tuyen et al., 2010). These user groups would have an 
incentive to prevent members from overstating their production levels (if seed ITQs are grandfathered) as this would 
dilute the shares of other members. Second, the cost of monitoring farmer compliance is expected to decline because 
members of FAs have an incentive to police the actions of other members, and rule-breakers would find it difficult 
to conceal their opportunistic behaviour from neighbours. Third, FA’s would also have a cost advantage over 
government agencies in collecting and disseminating information needed to support decentralised quota markets. On 
the other hand,  government agencies  would  have  cost  advantages in  assembling technical  information about 
sustainable  production  levels  in  different  parts  of  the  Lagoon,  establishing  quota  zones  and  their aggregate 
seed quota, and in resolving conflicts between user groups. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Privatisation of the TGCH Lagoon bed encouraged shrimp farmers to adopt intensive production methods. In the 
absence of well-defined property rights to lagoon water, farmers over-intensified as they were able to externalise the 
costs of their water pollution. In addition, the process of privatisation was not well regulated and natural waterways 
were blocked by earthen walls and fine-mesh nets. This aggravated the pollution problem and shrimps became 
increasingly prone to disease as the water quality deteriorated.  
 
Well-established relational contracts between shrimp farmers and wholesalers collapsed because the yield losses 
were widespread and farmers were unable to fulfil their supply contracts. Switching to more disease-resistant 
aquaculture  species  comes  at  the  expense  of  lower  profits  and  may  provide  only temporary relief from the 
water pollution problem. Considering the large number of poor households that depend on the Lagoon for a living, it 
is essential that levels of water pollution be reduced and managed. 
 
The analysis (briefly) reported in this paper suggests that water pollution generated by intensive aquaculture in 
TGCH Lagoon would best be addressed by allocating seed ITQs to farmers as members of local Fishery 
Associations, and devolving responsibility for quota compliance and markets to these user groups in order to benefit 
from their incentive and information advantages. Government would retain an important role within a co-
management regime - establishing quota zones and their quota limits, and resolving conflicts between Fishery 
Associations. While the analysis on which these recommendations are based is not objective in a quantitative sense, 
the study emphasises the systems view that food chains are shaped by social, institutional and natural settings. To 
analyse their performance, it is necessary to integrate knowledge of supply chain management, institutional and 
resource economics, property rights, technology and ecology, and to have a good understanding of the socio-
economic and political environment within which the chain operates. This study goes some way towards achieving 
an integrated approach but falls short of testing its recommendations against the views of communities and farmers 
who rely on the Tam Giang Cau Hai Lagoon for their livelihoods. 
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